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Social choice on complex objects: A geometric approach

Author

Listed:
  • Luigi Marengo
  • Simona Settepanella

Abstract

Marengo and Pasquali (2008) present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained. In this paper we extend and generalize this approach by providing a geometric model of individual preferences and social aggregation based on hyperplanes and their arrangements. As an application of this model we give a necessary condition for existence of a local social optimum. Moreover we address the question if a social decision rule depends also upon the number of voting agents. More precisely: are there social decision rules that can be obtained by an odd (even) number of voting agent which cannot be obtained by only three (two) voting agent? The answer is negative. Indeed three (or two) voting agent can produce all possible social decision rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Luigi Marengo & Simona Settepanella, 2008. "Social choice on complex objects: A geometric approach," LEM Papers Series 2008/28, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    • Handle: RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2008/28
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    File URL: http://www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/files/2008-28.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Luigi Marengo & Corrado Pasquali, 2011. "The construction of choice: a computational voting model," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 6(2), pages 139-156, November.
    2. Luigi Maregno & Corrado Pasquali, 2008. "A computational voting model," LEM Papers Series 2008/24, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social choice; object construction power; agenda power; intransitive cycles; arrangements; graph theory.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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