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To the Victor Belongs the Spoils? Party Membership and Public Sector Employment in Brazil

Author

Listed:
  • Fernanda Brollo

  • Pedro Forquesato, Juan Carlos Gozzi

Abstract

We analyze how political discretion affects the selection of government workers, using individual-level data on political party membership and matched employer-employee data on the universe of formal workers in Brazil. Exploiting close mayoral races, we find that winning an election leads to an increase of over 40% in the number of members of the winning party working in the municipal bureaucracy. Employment of members of the ruling party increases relatively more in senior positions, but also expands in lower-ranked jobs, suggesting that discretionary appointments are used both to influence policymaking and to reward supporters. We find that party members hired after their party is elected tend be of similar or even higher quality than members of the runner-up party, contrary to common perceptions that political appointees are less qualified. Moreover, the increased public employment of members of the ruling party is long-lasting, extending beyond the end of the mayoral term.

Suggested Citation

  • Fernanda Brollo & Pedro Forquesato, Juan Carlos Gozzi, 2018. "To the Victor Belongs the Spoils? Party Membership and Public Sector Employment in Brazil," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2018_20, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    • Handle: RePEc:spa:wpaper:2018wpecon20
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Lucas Braga de Melo & Valdemar Pinho Neto, 2026. "The Economic Returns of Firms’ Political Connections," Discussion Papers 175, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    3. Callen, Michael & Gulzar, Saad & Hasanain, Ali & Khan, Muhammad Yasir & Rezaee, Arman, 2023. "The political economy of public sector absence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    4. Maximiliano Lauletta & Martín A. Rossi & Christian A. Ruzzier, 2022. "Audits and Government Hiring Practices," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(353), pages 214-227, January.
    5. repec:aep:anales:4404 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Pedro Forquesato, 2022. "Who Benefits from Political Connections in Brazilian Municipalities," Papers 2204.09450, arXiv.org.
    7. Klenio Barbosa & Fernando V. Ferreira, 2019. "Occupy Government: Democracy and the Dynamics of Personnel Decisions and Public Sector Performance," NBER Working Papers 25501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Brassiolo, Pablo & Estrada, Ricardo & Fajardo, Gustavo, 2020. "My (running) mate, the mayor: Political ties and access to public sector jobs in Ecuador," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    9. Barbosa, Klenio & Ferreira, Fernando, 2023. "Occupy government: Democracy and the dynamics of personnel decisions and public finances," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    10. De La O, Ana L., 2024. "How clientelism undermines state capacity: Evidence from Mexican municipalities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    11. Voth, Hans-Joachim & Xu, Guo, 2019. "Patronage for Productivity: Selection and Performance in the Age of Sail," CEPR Discussion Papers 13963, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Samuel Bazzi & Claudio Labanca, 2023. "Campaign Connections," NBER Working Papers 31283, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets

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