Buyers' decision and price competition
This paper describes a price game in which buyersâ€™ decisions about how much and where to buy are based on different information and/or preferences. Such consumersâ€™ behavior is likely when demand comes from public agencies and state-owned firms. Consumers in this case are said to be uninformed. The model analyzes the price Nash equilibrium reached for any possible proportion of uninformed demand. In equilibrium there is always a positive probability that uninformed consumers pay a price above the monopoly level. For large proportions of uninformed consumers all firms charge a price above the monopoly level. The model also points out that the intense competition associated with Bertrand-like settings depends largely on the assumptions about consumersâ€™ behavior.
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- Nirvikar Singh & Xavier Vives, 1984. "Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(4), pages 546-554, Winter.
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