Dynamic deterrence analysis of factors affecting the management of Sudan Fishery
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References listed on IDEAS
- Leung, Siu Fai, 1991.
"How to make the fine fit the corporate crime? : An analysis of static and dynamic optimal punishment theories,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 243-256, July.
- Leung, S.F., 1991. "How to Make the Fine Fit the Corporate Crime? An Analysis of Static and Dynamic Optimal Punishment Theories," RCER Working Papers 261, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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KeywordsFishery regulations; dynamic deterrence model; Sudan; Tobit; management;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2012-09-22 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2012-09-22 (Environmental Economics)
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