Boycotts, power politics or trust building: how to prevent conflict?
In a game of imperfect information, the paper analyzes whether different types of intervention by third parties can ensure that political (ethnic, religious, social, . . . ) groups within a country will pursue a cooperative strategy and how easy it is to predict their effects. We conclude that a strong boycott is the most effective instrument, then comes a weak boycott, followed by power politics. Finally, apart from requiring very detailed information on the relevant parameters of the economy, the use of confidence building measures has a serious flaw: it is incapable of averting civil war.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Hoveniersberg 4, B-9000 Gent|
Phone: ++ 32 (0) 9 264 34 61
Fax: ++ 32 (0) 9 264 35 92
Web page: http://www.ugent.be/eb
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- S. CLAEYS & G. LANINE & K. SCHOORs, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/307, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
- A. Schollaert & D. Van De Gaer, 2005.
"Boycotts, power politics or trust building: how to prevent conflict?,"
Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium
05/308, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
- Arne Schollaert & Dirk Van de gaer, 2008. "Boycotts, Power Politics, or Trust Building: How to Prevent Conflict?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(2), pages 356-379, June.
- SCHOLLAERT, Arne & VAN DE GAER, Dirk, . "Boycotts, power politics, or trust building: How to prevent conflict?," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2043, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005.
"Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series
wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Claeys, Sophie & Lanine, Gleb & Schoors, Koen, 2005. "Bank supervision Russian style : rules versus enforcement and tacit objectives," BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
- P. Everaert & G. Sarens, 2005. "Outsourcing bij Vlaamse Ondernemingen: een Exploratief Onderzoek," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/306, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rug:rugwps:05/308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nathalie Verhaeghe)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.