Boycotts, Power Politics, or Trust Building: How to Prevent Conflict?
In a game of imperfect information, the paper analyses whether different types of intervention by third parties can ensure that political (ethnic, religious, social, etc.) groups within a country will pursue a cooperative strategy and how easy it is to predict their effects. We conclude that a strong boycott is the only instrument that is always effective and that trust building, although currently widely acclaimed by, e.g., the United Nations, is not only less effective but difficult to predict and - like power politics - can favour one group at the expense of the other.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 164 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: https://www.mohr.de/jite|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- S. CLAEYS & G. LANINE & K. SCHOORs, 2005. "Bank Supervision Russian Style: Rules vs Enforcement and Tacit Objectives," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/307, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
- A. Schollaert & D. Van De Gaer, 2005.
"Boycotts, power politics or trust building: how to prevent conflict?,"
Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium
05/308, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
- Arne Schollaert & Dirk Van de gaer, 2008. "Boycotts, Power Politics, or Trust Building: How to Prevent Conflict?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(2), pages 356-379, June.
- Sophie Claeys, & Gleb Lanine & Koen Schoors, 2005.
"Bank Supervision Russian style: Rules versus Enforcement and Tacit Objectives,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series
wp778, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Claeys, Sophie & Lanine, Gleb & Schoors, Koen, 2005. "Bank supervision Russian style: Rules versus enforcement and tacit objectives," BOFIT Discussion Papers 10/2005, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
- P. Everaert & G. Sarens, 2005. "Outsourcing bij Vlaamse Ondernemingen: een Exploratief Onderzoek," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/306, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200806)164:2_356:bppotb_2.0.tx_2-t. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.