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Cryptocurrency Voting Games

Author

Listed:
  • Bhattacherjee, Sanjay
  • Sarkar, Palash

Abstract

This work shows that weighted majority voting games occur in cryptocurrencies. In particular, two such games are highlighted. The first game, which we call the Rule Game, pertains to the scenario where the entities in the system engage in a voting procedure to accept or reject a change of rules. The second game, which we call the Attack Game, refers to the scenario where a group of entities in a cryptocurrency system can form a coalition to engage in double spending. For the Rule Game we provide analysis to argue that the Coleman’s preventive power measure is the appropriate tool for measuring a player’s influence in the game while for the Attack Game, we define a notion of stability based on the notion of minimal winning coalitions. For both the Rule Game and the Attack Game, we show how to analyse the games based on a snapshot of real world data for Bitcoin which is presently the most popular of all the cryptocurrencies.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhattacherjee, Sanjay & Sarkar, Palash, 2017. "Cryptocurrency Voting Games," MPRA Paper 83592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:83592
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
    2. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
    3. Chakravarty,Satya R. & Mitra,Manipushpak & Sarkar,Palash, 2015. "A Course on Cooperative Game Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107058798, January.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C15 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Statistical Simulation Methods: General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • Y10 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Data: Tables and Charts - - - Data: Tables and Charts
    • Y20 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Introductions and Prefaces - - - Introductions and Prefaces
    • Y80 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Related Disciplines - - - Related Disciplines

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