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Разграничение Полномочий Между Федеральным И Региональным Уровнями Власти В Области Налоговых Льгот. Фискальные Последствия
[The differentiation of the authority in tax incentives among the federal and regional levels: Fiscal implications]


  • Pinskaya, Milyausha
  • Kolesnik, Georgiy


The authors study the problems of differentiation in the authority levels to establish tax incentives among the federal and regional government bodies and assess the corresponding negative impact on the tax competition. It is shown that the federal intervention in the regional tax privileges may lead to a distortion of vertical tax competition, a shortfall in tax revenues in the regional budgets, as well as to the migration of the tax base between regions, thereby distorting the real picture of the profits allocation. The obtained results can be used by federal and regional public authorities for developing the proposals to improve mechanisms of tax privileges provision and interbudgetary transfers’ optimization.

Suggested Citation

  • Pinskaya, Milyausha & Kolesnik, Georgiy, 2015. "Разграничение Полномочий Между Федеральным И Региональным Уровнями Власти В Области Налоговых Льгот. Фискальные Последствия
    [The differentiation of the authority in tax incentives among the federal
    ," MPRA Paper 75805, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:75805

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Zodrow, George R. & Mieszkowski, Peter, 1986. "Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 356-370, May.
    2. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
    3. Alan J. Auerbach & Lawrence H. Summers, 1979. "The Investment Tax Credit: An Evaluation," NBER Working Papers 0404, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March.
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    More about this item


    tax power; tax privilege; tax competition; interbudgetary relations; federative system; vertical tax effect; consolidated group of taxpayers;

    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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