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Разграничение Полномочий Между Федеральным И Региональным Уровнями Власти В Области Налоговых Льгот: Фискальные Последствия

Author

Listed:
  • Пинская М.Р.
  • Колесник Г.В.

Abstract

В статье исследуются проблемы, связанные с разграничением налоговых полномочий уровней власти по установлению налоговых льгот и проводится оценка соответствующего негативного влияния на налоговую конкуренцию. Показано, что вмешательство федерального уровня в установление льгот по региональным налогам может приводить к искажению вертикальной налоговой конкуренции, появлению выпадающих налоговых доходов региональных бюджетов, а также к миграции налоговой базы между регионами, искажая тем самым реальную картину распределения прибыли. Полученные результаты могут использоваться федеральными и региональными органами власти при разработке предложений по совершенствованию механизмов предоставления налоговых привилегий и оптимизации межбюджетных трансфертов.

Suggested Citation

  • Пинская М.Р. & Колесник Г.В., 2016. "Разграничение Полномочий Между Федеральным И Региональным Уровнями Власти В Области Налоговых Льгот: Фискальные Последствия," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 52(3), pages 22-35, июль.
    • Handle: RePEc:scn:cememm:v:52:y:2016:i:3:p:22-35
    Note: Москва
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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