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Countervailing Conflict Interventions as a (Potentially Preventable) Prisoner’s Dilemma Outcome

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  • Dulal, Rajendra

Abstract

Scholars and policymakers have devoted much attention to issues of third party intervention in conflict. The present paper considers a conflict that draws two countervailing outside interveners. As in the realist perspective, the outside parties are drawn to intervene through some economic or geostrategic interest that would be promoted through the victory of an ally. Using a simple game theoretic model, I find conditions under which outside interveners fall prey to a Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome and become worse off through their own intervention. This result brings into question the desirability of escalatory conflict intervention. The paper also studies conditions required for the United Nations, or some such supra-national institution, to prevent a Prisoner’s Dilemma outcome and successfully deter escalatory bilateral intervention. The findings show that the United Nations can alter the game equilibrium, and deter escalatory intervention, by imposing sufficient costs on the intervening parties.

Suggested Citation

  • Dulal, Rajendra, 2013. "Countervailing Conflict Interventions as a (Potentially Preventable) Prisoner’s Dilemma Outcome," MPRA Paper 56955, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2013.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:56955
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/56955/1/MPRA_paper_56955.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kevin Siqueira, 2003. "Conflict and third-party intervention," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 389-400.
    2. Chang, Yang-Ming & Potter, Joel & Sanders, Shane, 2007. "War and peace: Third-party intervention in conflict," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 954-974, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conflict; Prisoner's Dilemma ; Game theory;

    JEL classification:

    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

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