Social welfare and social choice in different individuals’ preferences
This paper discusses both social welfare and social choice using Arrow’s impossibility theorem for multi-profile preference case and two versions of it for single-profile preference case. Between these two versions first one assumes a two-individual society and the second one, which is similar to a theorem of Pollak, assuming two or more individuals. In single-profile version decisiveness, simple and complex diversity must occur. This paper considers a special case of Arrow’s theorem, namely single-profile preference. Diversity and decisiveness of preferences are discussed for two individuals and more than two individuals in a society.
|Date of creation:||24 Jan 2011|
|Date of revision:||19 Jun 2011|
|Publication status:||Published in International Journal of Human Development and Sustainability 1.5(2012): pp. 11-22|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2009.
"Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure,"
50671, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 25 Sep 2009.
- Jamal Nazrul Islam & Haradhan Kumar Mohajan & Pahlaj Moolio, 2009. "Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure," KASBIT Journal of Management & Social Science, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 2, pages 42-66, December.
- repec:ksb:journl:v:2:y:2009:i:1:p:42-66 is not listed on IDEAS
- Miller, Michael K., 2009. "Social choice theory without Pareto: The pivotal voter approach," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 251-255, September.
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1984. "The Single Profile Analogues to Multi Profile Theorems: Mathematical Logic's Approach," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 25(3), pages 719-30, October.
- Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2010. "Methods of voting system and manipulation of voting," MPRA Paper 50854, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2010.
- Roberts, Kevin W S, 1980. "Social Choice Theory: The Single-profile and Multi-profile Approaches," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(2), pages 441-50, January.
- Parks, Robert P, 1976. "An Impossibility Theorem for Fixed Preferences: A Dictatorial Bergson-Samuelson Welfare Function," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 447-50, October.
- Pollak, Robert A, 1979. "Bergson-Samuelson Social Welfare Functions and the Theory of Social Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(1), pages 73-90, February.
- Barbera, Salvador, 1980. "Pivotal voters : A new proof of arrow's theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 13-16.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:50851. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.