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The international mercury cartel, 1928-1949

Author

Listed:
  • López-Morell, Miguel A.
  • Segreto, Luciano

Abstract

Mercury has been one of the most persistent cases in contemporary history of international market regulations and this in spite of its having been affected by important technological changes and the regular discovery of new deposits. This paper offers an approach to the least known period, although perhaps the one in which the greatest rises in process and production occurred as a consequence of market manipulation. The period coincides with a series of agreements between the Spanish and the Italian producers and the outcome was a worldwide cartel known as “Mercurio Europeo” which came into being in 1928. The aims of this work will, therefore, be first to describe the features of the various stages of development of the international mercury market during the first half of the twentieth century, with emphasis on the characteristics and conditioning factors in each period. Secondly, the objective is to analyze the various market agreements that came about, the effectiveness of the clauses therein, the construction of distribution networks and the influence that the increase in production had on other mines and on certain technological developments.

Suggested Citation

  • López-Morell, Miguel A. & Segreto, Luciano, 2013. "The international mercury cartel, 1928-1949," MPRA Paper 46772, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:46772
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/46772/3/MPRA_paper_46772.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. José Luis García Ruiz, 2007. "Nacionalizando el capital bancario: Banesto y Paribas (1902-1927)," Investigaciones de Historia Económica - Economic History Research (IHE-EHR), Journal of the Spanish Economic History Association, Asociación Española de Historia Económica, vol. 9, pages 79-108.
    2. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2006. "What Determines Cartel Success?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(1), pages 43-95, March.
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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Are Cartels Pragmatic Responses to Market Failures?
      by berodsat in NEP-HIS blog on 2013-07-08 18:30:55

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mercury; Cartels; International trade; history;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • N54 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: 1913-

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