Preference-based Cooperation in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game: Whole Population Cooperation without Information Flow across Matches
This paper studies the possibility of cooperation based on players' preferences. Consider the following infinitely repeated game, similar to Ghosh and Ray (1996). At each stage, uncountable numbers of players are randomly matched without information about their partners' past actions and play a prisoner's dilemma game. The players have the option to continue their relationship, and they all have the same discount factor. Also, they have two possible types: high ability player (H) or low ability player (L). H can produce better outcomes for its partner as well as for itself than L can. I look for an equilibrium that is robust against both pair-wise deviation and individual deviation and call such equilibrium a social equilibrium. I show that in this setting, long term cooperative behavior can arise in a social equilibrium. H wants to match and play only with another H because an HH match produces better outcomes for H than an HL match. So H would break a match with L to increase the possibility of meeting another H, and thus H would not play any cooperative action with L. L knows this intention of H and realizes that L can only cooperate with another L. Consequently, both HH and LL matches are endowed with a scarcity value. This scarcity value is utilized by players to sustain cooperative relationships. Therefore, in a social equilibrium, whole players can play long term cooperative actions because of their preferences for their partners' types.
|Date of creation:||2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Parikshit Ghosh & Debraj Ray, 1996. "Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 491-519.
- Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(3), pages 567-588.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4650. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.