Allocation by coercion
The problem of allocating indivisible goods is considered when groups of individuals can make use of their power to plunder other groups. A monarch in a group of individuals is an individual who always obtains one of his most preferred goods. A Paretian condition together with a requirement of robust stability lead to the existence of monarchs in all subsets of individuals, except possibly one.
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- Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567.
- Shapley, Lloyd & Scarf, Herbert, 1974. "On cores and indivisibility," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 23-37, March.
- Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(6), pages 1403-1434, November.
- Michele Piccione & Ariel Rubinstein, 2007. "Equilibrium in the Jungle," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 883-896, 07.
- Ergin, Haluk I., 2000. "Consistency in house allocation problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 77-97, August.
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