The government economic agenda in a society of unequally rational individuals
What economic roles, if any, should government play? This is still an incompletely analyzed issue that different individuals – depending on their ideologies, rent-seeking opportunities, and analytical abilities – may answer very differently. To advance its analysis, this paper recognizes that human rationality (as empirically testable cognitive abilities) is bounded unequally across individuals, and is therefore a unique scarce resource that markets and government allocate in significantly different ways. The results conflict with ideologies of both socialism and classical liberalism, but agree with two puzzles of recent economic history and with ideological compromises in actual economic policies.
|Date of creation:||11 Nov 2008|
|Date of revision:||06 Dec 2009|
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