Consistency of the Multi-Choice Shapley Value
We define the potential of multi-choice cooperative games, find the relationship between the multi-choice Shapley value and the potential, and show that the multi-choice Shapley value is consistent.
|Date of creation:||31 Jul 1996|
|Date of revision:|
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- Hsiao Chih-Ru & Raghavan T. E. S., 1993. "Shapley Value for Multichoice Cooperative Games, I," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 240-256, April.
- Hsiao, Chih-Ru, 1995. "A note on non-essential players in multi-choice cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 424-432.
- Hsiao, Chih-Ru & Raghavan, T E S, 1992. "Monotonicity and Dummy Free Property for Multi-choice Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 21(3), pages 301-12.
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