The Potential of Multi-choice Cooperative Games
We defined the potential for multi-choice cooperative games, and found the relationship between the potential and the multi-choice Shapley value. Moreover, we show that the multi-choice Shapley is consistent.
|Date of creation:||02 Oct 1994|
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- Hsiao Chih-Ru & Raghavan T. E. S., 1993. "Shapley Value for Multichoice Cooperative Games, I," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 240-256, April.
- Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "Potential, Value, and Consistency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 589-614, May.
- Hsiao, Chih-Ru, 1995. "A note on non-essential players in multi-choice cooperative games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 424-432.
- Hsiao, Chih-Ru & Raghavan, T E S, 1992. "Monotonicity and Dummy Free Property for Multi-choice Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 301-12.
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