IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Das Goodwill-Modell des Wettbewerbsmarktes: Vertrauen ermöglichen und Arbeitsplätze schaffen
[The Goodwill Modell of the Competitive Market: Allowing for trust and creating jobs]


  • Rapold, Ingo


The Goodwill Model of the Competitive Market Allowing for Trust and Creating Jobs Consumers often cannot judge the quality of goods and services at the time of the purchase decision. The goodwill model explains how the market participants deal with this problem. It makes a distinction between markets for search goods, experience goods and credence goods. In markets for experience goods the goodwill mechanism can ensure completely by itself that suppliers behave with integrity. The goodwill mechanism causes irreversible costs of the market entrance in the form of goodwill investments for new suppliers. These irreversible costs of the market entrance lead to the fact that established suppliers can permanently achieve prize and volume premiums if they behave with integrity. Established suppliers, therefore, abstain from a hidden reduction of the quality of their products. The strength of the goodwill mechanism lies in the fact that it adapts itself in markets for experience goods to changed circumstances of the market by changes in the communications behavior of the market participants and thereby it stabilizes the market development and optimizes the market result. Markets for credence goods, however, are, in spite of the social institution Goodwill, characterized by market failure. The root causes for this result are selected sporadic bad quality deliveries which cannot be recognized by the consumers as those. Suitable regulations to stabilize markets for credence goods artificially generate irreversible costs of the market entrance for new suppliers. These created irreversible costs enable the established suppliers of credence goods to permanently earn positive economic profits by behaving with integrity. Numerous regulations which exist today in functioning markets for credence goods establish such irreversible costs of the market entrance. The abolition of such regulations can lead to market failure. An example having a lasting effect even today is the transformation which occurred between 1980 and 1999 of the US banking system which developed from a system of separated commercial and investment banks to a system of fully integrated banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Rapold, Ingo, 2009. "Das Goodwill-Modell des Wettbewerbsmarktes: Vertrauen ermöglichen und Arbeitsplätze schaffen
    [The Goodwill Modell of the Competitive Market: Allowing for trust and creating jobs]
    ," MPRA Paper 18275, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:18275

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
    2. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1985. "Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 21-41, Supplemen.
    3. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Goodwill; reputation; price premiums; mouth-to-mouth-information; sunk costs; quality uncertainty; search goods; experience goods; credence goods; minimum quality; behavior with integrity; established suppliers; selected sporadic bad quality deliveries; hidden reduction of the quality of goods; market failure;

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:18275. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.