IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/15646.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Perfect correlated equilibria in stopping games

Author

Listed:
  • Heller, Yuval

Abstract

We prove that every undiscounted multi-player stopping game in discrete time admits an approximate correlated equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium has five appealing properties: (1) “Trembling-hand” perfectness - players do not use non-credible threats; (2) Normal-form correlation - communication is required only before the game starts; (3) Uniformness - it is an approximate equilibrium in any long enough finite-horizon game and in any discounted game with high enough discount factor; (4) Universal correlation device -the device does not depend on the specific parameters of the game. (5) Canonical - the signal each player receives is equivalent to the strategy he plays in equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Heller, Yuval, 2009. "Perfect correlated equilibria in stopping games," MPRA Paper 15646, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15646
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15646/1/MPRA_paper_15646.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17228/1/MPRA_paper_17228.pdf
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25891/1/MPRA_paper_25891.pdf
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33819/1/MPRA_paper_33819.pdf
    File Function: revised version
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Myerson, R B, 1986. "Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, pages 133-154.
    2. Barry Nalebuff & John G. Riley, 1984. "Asymmetric Equilibrium in the War of Attrition," UCLA Economics Working Papers 317, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-358, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    stochastic games; stopping games; correlated equilibrium; perfect equilibrium; Ramsey Theorem.;

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:15646. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.