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اقتصاد اطلاعات نامتقارن
[Economics of Asymmetric information]

Author

Listed:
  • Mirjalili, Seyed hossein

Abstract

This article begins by examining the origins of the economics of asymmetric information through questioning one of the assumptions of the theory of perfect competition, and then turns to Hayek’s pioneering article on the use of information in society. The third section addresses the emergence of the field of information economics, while the fourth explains the awarding of the Nobel Prize for research in this area. The fifth section discusses the role of information in economic analysis, and the sixth elaborates on asymmetric information and the ways to overcome information asymmetry.

Suggested Citation

  • Mirjalili, Seyed hossein, 2009. "اقتصاد اطلاعات نامتقارن [Economics of Asymmetric information]," MPRA Paper 125774, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2009.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:125774
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/125774/1/MPRA_paper_125774.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2000. "The Contributions of the Economics of Information to Twentieth Century Economics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1441-1478.
    2. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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