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Demokratiets vilkårlighed: En analyse af forekomsten af valgparadokser ved tre folketingsvalg
[The arbitrariness of democracy: An analysis of the occurrence of voting paradoxes in three Danish parliamentary elections]

Author

Listed:
  • Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter
  • Duminski, Emily
  • Horndrup, Søren Nikolai

Abstract

English: In a democratic system the preferences of individual voters may be aggregated into a collective preference in an infinite number of different ways following which a specific rule will allocate the total number of seats between political parties. If the method produces results that diverge from the underlying preferences of the voters, so-called voting paradoxes may occur. Such are well-known from first-past-the-post/plurality elections (e.g., US and British elections) but it is generally overlooked that such phenomena may also occur under proportional representation. By using data from the Danish National Election Surveys made in connection with the parliamentary elections of 2007, 2011 and 2015 we analyze the possible empirical occurrence of four voting paradoxes identified in social choice theory. We demonstrate that all four voting paradoxes occur empirically, thereby questioning the extent to which the outcomes of parliamentary elections may be seen as being an expression of a meaningful reflection of a ‘will of the people’. Danish: I et demokratisk system kan vælgerpræferencer aggregeres til en samlet kollektiv præference på et utal af forskellige måder, hvorefter en specifik aggregeringsmetode fordeler det samlede antal mandater mellem partierne. Hvis metoden producerer resultater, som divergerer fra vælgernes underliggende præferencer, opstår der såkaldte valgparadokser. De kendes fra flertalsvalgsystemer (f.eks. amerikanske og britiske valg), men det er generelt overset, at de også kan forekomme under forholdstalsvalg. Ved brug af data fra valgundersøgelserne i.f.m. folketingsvalgene 2007, 2011 og 2015 analyseres den mulige empiriske forekomst af fire teoretisk udledte valgparadokser fra social choice teori. Vi viser, at alle fire valgparadokser forekommer empirisk. Dermed sættes der spørgsmålstegn ved, i hvilket omfang folketingsvalgs udfald kan udlægges som en afspejling af folkets vilje.

Suggested Citation

  • Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter & Duminski, Emily & Horndrup, Søren Nikolai, 2023. "Demokratiets vilkårlighed: En analyse af forekomsten af valgparadokser ved tre folketingsvalg [The arbitrariness of democracy: An analysis of the occurrence of voting paradoxes in three Danish parliamentary elections]," MPRA Paper 118922, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:118922
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2018. "Trump, Condorcet and Borda: Voting paradoxes in the 2016 Republican presidential primaries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 29-35.
    2. Adrian Deemen, 2014. "On the empirical relevance of Condorcet’s paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 311-330, March.
    3. William V. Gehrlein, 2006. "Condorcet’s Paradox," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-540-33799-7, December.
    4. van Deemen, Adrian M A & Vergunst, Noel P, 1998. "Empirical Evidence of Paradoxes of Voting in Dutch Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 475-490, December.
    5. Jones, Bradford & Radcliff, Benjamin & Taber, Charles & Timpone, Richard, 1995. "Condorcet Winners and the Paradox of Voting: Probability Calculations for Weak Preference Orders," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(1), pages 137-144, March.
    6. William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2011. "Voting Paradoxes and Group Coherence," Studies in Choice and Welfare, Springer, number 978-3-642-03107-6, March.
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    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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