Bribing to Circumvent Capture and Facilitate Participation in Social Programs: Evidence from Indian Villages
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsBribery; Program Capture; Welfare Effects; Rural India;
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-DEV-2011-09-16 (Development)
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