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Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices are Kept Secret

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  • Daniel R. Vincent

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  • Daniel R. Vincent, 1989. "Bidding Off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices are Kept Secret," Discussion Papers 838, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:838
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1989. "How Auctions Work for Wine and Art," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 23-36, Summer.
    2. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
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