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On Communication, Bounded Complexity, and Cooperation

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  • Eitan Zemel

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  • Eitan Zemel, 1985. "On Communication, Bounded Complexity, and Cooperation," Discussion Papers 685, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:685
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    File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/685.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Neyman, Abraham, 1985. "Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 227-229.
    2. Kalai, Ehud & Stanford, William, 1988. "Finite Rationality and Interpersonal Complexity in Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 397-410, March.
    3. Robert J. Aumann, 2025. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: SELECTED CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY, chapter 4, pages 73-113, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    Cited by:

    1. Ehud Kalai, 1987. "Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 783, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Eitan Zemel, 1988. "Small Talk and Cooperation A Note on Bounded Rationality," Discussion Papers 803, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

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