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Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster

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  • Roger B. Myerson

Abstract

The Allied leaders who produced the Treaty of Versailles and the German leaders who created the Weimar constitution relied significantly on the theoretical expertise of John Maynard Keynes and Max Weber respectively. It is argued here that integrated analytical approaches to the study of political and economic competition, which have been developed with game-theoretic methodology since the time of Keynes and Weber, can offer a valuable perspective to better understand the decisions that faced the leaders of Weimar and Versailles.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster," Discussion Papers 1216R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1216r
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Keynes, John Maynard, 1919. "The Economic Consequences of the Peace," History of Economic Thought Books, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, number keynes1919.
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    6. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
    7. Dixit, Avinash & Londregan, John, 2000. "Political Power and the Credibility of Government Debt," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 80-105, September.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Kwang-Jin Kim & Patrick James, 2010. "Learning From The Great War? The Origin Of Democratic Peace," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(5-6), pages 487-505.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • N44 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: 1913-

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