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An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Hedge Contracts on Bidding Behavior

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  • Frank A. Wolak

Abstract

A major concern in the design of wholesale electricity markets is the potential for the exercise of market power by generating unit owners. To better understand the determinants of generating unit owner market power and how it is exercised, this paper derives a model of bidding behavior in a competitive electricity market which incorporates various sources of uncertainty and the impact of the electricity generator's position in the financial hedge contract market on its expected profit-maximizing bidding behavior. The model is first used to characterize the profit- maximizing market price that a generator would like set by its bidding strategy for several hedge contract and spot sales combinations. This model applied to bid and contract data obtained from the first three months of operation of the National Electricity Market (NEM1) in Australia to answer several questions about the bidding behavior of a major participant in this market. This analysis illustrates the sensitivity of expected profit-maximizing bidding strategies to the amount of financial hedge contracts held by the generating unit owner. It also provides strong evidence for the effectiveness of financial hedge contracts as a means to mitigate market power during initial stages of operation of a wholesale electricity market.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank A. Wolak, 2001. "An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Hedge Contracts on Bidding Behavior," NBER Working Papers 8212, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:8212
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Green, Richard J & Newbery, David M, 1992. "Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 929-953, October.
    2. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-1277, November.
    3. Green, R., 1996. "The Electricity Contract Market," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9616, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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    Cited by:

    1. Frank A. Wolak, 2014. "Regulating Competition in Wholesale Electricity Supply," NBER Chapters, in: Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?, pages 195-289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. van Koten, Silvester & Ortmann, Andreas, 2013. "Structural versus behavioral remedies in the deregulation of electricity markets: An experimental investigation motivated by policy concerns," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 256-265.
    3. Alejandro Diaz-Bautista, 2005. "El Cambio Estructural y la Regulacion del Sector Electrico Mexicano," Industrial Organization 0504011, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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