Lagged-Price Reimbursement Contracts: The Impact of Medicare Part B on Pharmaceutical Price Growth
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- Elena Krasnokutskaya & Katja Seim, 2011. "Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(6), pages 2653-2686, October.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CTA-2023-12-04 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-HEA-2023-12-04 (Health Economics)
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