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Are Managers Paid for Market Power?

Author

Listed:
  • Renjie Bao
  • Jan De Loecker
  • Jan Eeckhout

Abstract

To answer the question whether managers are paid for market power, we propose a theory of executive compensation in an economy where firms have market power, and the market for man- agers is competitive. We identify two distinct channels that contribute to manager pay in the model: market power and firm size. Both increase the profitability of the firm, which makes managers more valuable as it increases their marginal product. Using data on executive compensation from Com- pustat, we quantitatively analyze how market power affects Manager Pay and how it changes over time. We attribute on average 45.8% of Manager Pay to market power, from 38.0% in 1994 to 48.8% in 2019. Over this period, market power accounts for 57.8% of growth. We also find there is a lot of heterogeneity within the distribution of managers. For the top managers, 80.3% of their pay in 2019 is due to market power. Top managers are hired disproportionately by firms with market power, and they get rewarded for it, increasingly so.

Suggested Citation

  • Renjie Bao & Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, 2022. "Are Managers Paid for Market Power?," NBER Working Papers 29918, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29918
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    Cited by:

    1. Bas, Maria & Fontagné, Lionel & Iodice, Irene & Orefice, Gianluca, 2025. "Heterogeneous trade elasticity and managerial skills," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C).
    2. Mertens, Matthias & Mottironi, Bernardo, 2023. "Do larger firms exert more market power? Markups and markdowns along the size distribution," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 121283, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    3. Mertens, Matthias & Mottironi, Bernardo, 2025. "Do larger firms exert more market power? Markups and markdowns along the size distribution," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 128958, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E2 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment
    • J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

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