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Understanding the Revenue Potential of Tax Compliance Investment

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  • Natasha Sarin
  • Lawrence H. Summers

Abstract

In a July 2020 report, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that modest investments in the IRS would generate somewhere between $60 and $100 billion in additional revenue over a decade. This is qualitatively correct. But quantitatively, the revenue potential is much more significant than the CBO report suggests. We highlight five reasons for the CBO’s underestimation: 1) the scale of the investment in the IRS contemplated is modest and far short of sufficient even to return the IRS budget to 2011 levels; 2) the CBO contemplates a limited range of interventions, excluding entirely progress on information reporting and technological advancements; 3) the estimates assume rapidly diminishing returns to marginal increases in investment; 4) the estimates leave out the effect of increased enforcement on taxpayer decision-making; and 5) the use of the 10-year window means that the long-run benefits of increased enforcement are excluded. We discuss these issues, present an alternative calculation, and conclude that a commitment to restoring tax compliance efforts to historical levels could generate over $1 trillion in the next decade.

Suggested Citation

  • Natasha Sarin & Lawrence H. Summers, 2020. "Understanding the Revenue Potential of Tax Compliance Investment," NBER Working Papers 27571, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27571
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Slemrod, Joel & Blumenthal, Marsha & Christian, Charles, 2001. "Taxpayer response to an increased probability of audit: evidence from a controlled experiment in Minnesota," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 455-483, March.
    2. Congressional Budget Office, 2020. "Trends in the Internal Revenue Service’s Funding and Enforcement," Reports 56422, Congressional Budget Office.
    3. Congressional Budget Office, 2018. "Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2019 to 2028," Reports 54667, Congressional Budget Office.
    4. Jason DeBacker & Bradley T. Heim & Anh Tran & Alexander Yuskavage, 2018. "Once Bitten, Twice Shy? The Lasting Impact of Enforcement on Tax Compliance," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(1), pages 1-35.
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    Cited by:

    1. Knut Løyland & Oddbjørn Raaum & Gaute Torsvik & Arnstein Øvrum, 2024. "Evaluating compliance gains of expanding tax enforcement," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 91(361), pages 142-162, January.
    2. John Guyton & Patrick Langetieg & Daniel Reck & Max Risch & Gabriel Zucman, 2021. "Tax Evasion at the Top of the Income Distribution: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 28542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence

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