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Educator Incentives and Educational Triage in Rural Primary Schools

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel O. Gilligan
  • Naureen Karachiwalla
  • Ibrahim Kasirye
  • Adrienne M. Lucas
  • Derek Neal

Abstract

In low-income countries, educators often encourage weak primary students to drop out before reaching the end of primary school in order to avoid the negative attention they receive when their students perform poorly on primary leaving exams. We conducted an experiment in rural Uganda that sought to reduce dropout rates in grade six and seven by rewarding teachers for the performance of each of their students. Teachers responded to this Pay for Percentile (PFP) incentive system in ways that raised attendance rates two school years later from .56 to .60. These attendance gains were driven primarily by outcomes in treatment schools that provide textbooks for grade six math students, where two-year attendance rates rose from .57 to .64. In these same schools, students whose initial skills levels prepared them to use grade six math texts enjoyed significant gains in math achievement. We find little evidence that PFP improved attendance or achievement in schools without books even though PFP had the same impact on reported teacher effort in schools with and without books. We document several results that are consistent with the hypothesis that teacher effort and books are complements in education production.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel O. Gilligan & Naureen Karachiwalla & Ibrahim Kasirye & Adrienne M. Lucas & Derek Neal, 2018. "Educator Incentives and Educational Triage in Rural Primary Schools," NBER Working Papers 24911, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24911
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    Cited by:

    1. David K. Evans & Fei Yuan & Deon Filmer, 2020. "Are Teachers in Africa Poorly Paid? Evidence from 15 Countries," Working Papers 538, Center for Global Development.
    2. Jason T. Kerwin & Rebecca L. Thornton, 2021. "Making the Grade: The Sensitivity of Education Program Effectiveness to Input Choices and Outcome Measures," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 251-264, May.
    3. Karthik Muralidharan & Mauricio Romero & Kaspar Wüthrich, 2025. "Factorial Designs, Model Selection, and (Incorrect) Inference in Randomized Experiments," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 589-604, May.
    4. Isaac Mbiti & Mauricio Romero & Youdi Schipper, 2023. "Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(653), pages 1968-2000.
    5. Matteo Bobba & Tim Ederer & Gianmarco León-Ciliotta & Christopher A. Neilson & Marco Nieddu, 2021. "Teacher compensation and structural inequality: Evidence from centralized teacher school choice in Perú," Economics Working Papers 1788, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    6. Tomoki Fujii & Maki Nakajima & Sijia Xu, 2021. "Teaching in the Right Context: Textbook Supply Program, Language, and Vocabulary Ability in Vietnam," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 2-2021, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    7. Yue-Yi Hwa & Clare Leaver, 2021. "Management in education systems," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 37(2), pages 367-391.
    8. Annie Duflo & Jessica Kiessel & Adrienne Lucas, 2020. "Experimental Evidence on Alternative Policies to Increase Learning at Scale," NBER Working Papers 27298, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Chang, Fang & Wang, Huan & Qu, Yaqiong & Zheng, Qiang & Loyalka, Prashant & Sylvia, Sean & Shi, Yaojiang & Dill, Sarah-Eve & Rozelle, Scott, 2020. "The impact of pay-for-percentile incentive on low-achieving students in rural China," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    10. Isaac Mbiti & Karthik Muralidharan & Mauricio Romero & Youdi Schipper & Constantine Manda & Rakesh Rajani, 2019. "Inputs, Incentives, and Complementarities in Education: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(3), pages 1627-1673.
    11. Berlinski, Samuel & Ramos, Alejandra, 2020. "Teacher mobility and merit pay: Evidence from a voluntary public award program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I0 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - General
    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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