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Educator Incentives and Educational Triage in Rural Primary Schools

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel O. Gilligan
  • Naureen Karachiwalla
  • Ibrahim Kasirye
  • Adrienne M. Lucas
  • Derek Neal

Abstract

In low-income countries, primary school student achievement is often far below grade level, and dropout rates remain high. Further, some educators actively encourage weaker students to drop out before reaching the end of primary school to avoid the negative attention that a school receives when its students perform poorly on their national primary leaving exams. We report the results of an experiment in rural Uganda that sought to both promote learning and reduce dropout rates. We offered bonus payments to Grade 6 (P6) teachers that rewarded each teacher for the math performance of each of their students relative to comparable students in other schools. This pay for percentile (PFP) incentive scheme did not improve overall P6 math performance, but it did reduce dropout rates. PFP treatment raised attendance rates a full year after treatment ended, from 0.56 to 0.60. In schools with math books, treatment increased attendance rates from 0.57 to 0.64, and PFP also improved performance on test items covered by P6 books. PFP did not improve any measure of attendance, achievement, or attainment in schools without books.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel O. Gilligan & Naureen Karachiwalla & Ibrahim Kasirye & Adrienne M. Lucas & Derek Neal, 2022. "Educator Incentives and Educational Triage in Rural Primary Schools," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 57(1), pages 79-111.
  • Handle: RePEc:uwp:jhriss:v:57:y:2022:i:1:p:79-111
    Note: DOI: 10.3368/jhr.57.1.1118-9871R2
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David K. Evans & Fei Yuan & Deon Filmer, 2020. "Are Teachers in Africa Poorly Paid? Evidence from 15 Countries," Working Papers 538, Center for Global Development.
    2. Jason T. Kerwin & Rebecca L. Thornton, 2021. "Making the Grade: The Sensitivity of Education Program Effectiveness to Input Choices and Outcome Measures," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 251-264, May.
    3. Karthik Muralidharan & Mauricio Romero & Kaspar Wüthrich, 2025. "Factorial Designs, Model Selection, and (Incorrect) Inference in Randomized Experiments," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 589-604, May.
    4. Isaac Mbiti & Mauricio Romero & Youdi Schipper, 2023. "Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(653), pages 1968-2000.
    5. Matteo Bobba & Tim Ederer & Gianmarco León-Ciliotta & Christopher A. Neilson & Marco Nieddu, 2021. "Teacher compensation and structural inequality: Evidence from centralized teacher school choice in Perú," Economics Working Papers 1788, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    6. Tomoki Fujii & Maki Nakajima & Sijia Xu, 2021. "Teaching in the Right Context: Textbook Supply Program, Language, and Vocabulary Ability in Vietnam," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 2-2021, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    7. Yue-Yi Hwa & Clare Leaver, 2021. "Management in education systems," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 37(2), pages 367-391.
    8. Annie Duflo & Jessica Kiessel & Adrienne Lucas, 2020. "Experimental Evidence on Alternative Policies to Increase Learning at Scale," NBER Working Papers 27298, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Chang, Fang & Wang, Huan & Qu, Yaqiong & Zheng, Qiang & Loyalka, Prashant & Sylvia, Sean & Shi, Yaojiang & Dill, Sarah-Eve & Rozelle, Scott, 2020. "The impact of pay-for-percentile incentive on low-achieving students in rural China," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    10. Isaac Mbiti & Karthik Muralidharan & Mauricio Romero & Youdi Schipper & Constantine Manda & Rakesh Rajani, 2019. "Inputs, Incentives, and Complementarities in Education: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 134(3), pages 1627-1673.
    11. Berlinski, Samuel & Ramos, Alejandra, 2020. "Teacher mobility and merit pay: Evidence from a voluntary public award program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I0 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - General
    • J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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