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Is The Monetarist Arithmetic Unpleasant?

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  • Martín Uribe

Abstract

The unpleasant monetarist arithmetic of Sargent and Wallace (1981) states that in a fiscally dominant regime tighter money now can cause higher inflation in the future. In spite of the qualifier ‘unpleasant,’ this result is positive in nature, and, therefore, void of normative content. I analyze conditions under which it is optimal in a welfare sense for the central bank to delay inflation by issuing debt to finance part of the fiscal deficit. The analysis is conducted in the context of a model in which the aforementioned monetarist arithmetic holds, in the sense that if the government finds it optimal to delay inflation, it does so knowing that it would result in higher inflation in the future. The central result of the paper is that delaying inflation is optimal when the fiscal deficit is expected to decline over time.

Suggested Citation

  • Martín Uribe, 2016. "Is The Monetarist Arithmetic Unpleasant?," NBER Working Papers 22866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22866
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kiguel, Miguel A & Neumeyer, Pablo Andres, 1995. "Seigniorage and Inflation: The Case of Argentina," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(3), pages 672-682, August.
    2. Thomas J. Sargent & Neil Wallace, 1984. "Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Brian Griffiths & Geoffrey E. Wood (ed.), Monetarism in the United Kingdom, pages 15-41, Palgrave Macmillan.
    3. Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie & Uribe, Martin, 2004. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy under imperfect competition," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 183-209, June.
    4. Inagaki, Kazuyuki, 2009. "Estimating the interest rate semi-elasticity of the demand for money in low interest rate environments," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 147-154, January.
    5. Sack, Brian, 2000. "Does the fed act gradually? A VAR analysis," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 229-256, August.
    6. Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Interest-Rate Smoothing," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(4), pages 861-886.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sergey Pekarski, 2017. "Tight Money and the Sustainability of Public Debt," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 13(1), pages 191-223, February.
    2. Carlos Goncalves & Mauro Rodrigues & Fernando Genta, 2022. "Elusive Unpleasantness," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2022_16, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    3. Tomás Marinozzi & Mariano Fernández, 2020. "Una breve revisón sobre la literatura de las metas de inflación," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 755, Universidad del CEMA.
    4. Rodolfo E. Manuelli & Juan I. Vizcaino, 2017. "Monetary Policy with Declining Deficits: Theory and an Application to Recent Argentine Monetary Policy," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 99(4), pages 351-375.
    5. Federico Sturzenegger, 2019. "Macri´s Macro: The meandering road to stability and growth," Working Papers 135, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Oct 2019.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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