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Inflation, Tariffs and Tax Enforcement Costs

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  • Joshua Aizenman

Abstract

This paper derives the dependency of optimal tariff and inflation tax on tax collection and enforcement costs. The analysis is done for a small, open economy. The existence of such costs can justify tariff and inflation tax policies as optimal revenue-raising devices. This paper suggests that greater government demand for revenue will increase the use of inflation and tariffs as revenue devices. The analysis derives elasticity rules that tie optimal tariff and inflation rates to the costs of tax collection.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua Aizenman, 1985. "Inflation, Tariffs and Tax Enforcement Costs," NBER Working Papers 1712, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1712
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    File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w1712.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Siegel, Jeremy J., 1978. "Notes on optimal taxation and the optimal rate of inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 297-305, April.
    2. Joshua Aizenman, 1986. "On the Complementarity of Commercial Policy, Capital Controls, and Inflation Tax," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 19(1), pages 114-133, February.
    3. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1982. "Inflation and Welfare in the Steady State," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(3), pages 561-577, June.
    4. Harberger, Arnold C, 1971. "Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive Essay," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 785-797, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Edwards, Sebastian & Tabellini, Guido, 1991. "The political economy of fiscal policy and inflation in developing countries : an empirical analysis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 703, The World Bank.
    2. Derek Hung Chiat Chen, 2003. "Intertemporal excess burden, bequest motives, and the budget deficit," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3086, The World Bank.

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