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Economic Implications of ERISA

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  • Jeremy I. Bulow
  • Myron S. Scholes
  • Peter Menell

Abstract

If the intent of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, ERISA, was to assure that beneficiaries of insolvent pension plans receive adequate pension benefits, sharp increases in nominal rates of interest have blunted that purpose. Without an increase in these rates, the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, PBGC, the insurance agency established to guarantee benefits, faced large liabilities on the terminations of pension plans. We examine the economics of pension funds and the funding of pension funds before and after the enactment of ERISA. The Act changed the economics of pension funds. The PBGC, the employer, and the employees have interests in the assets of the pension plan. The PBGC can tax corporations to pay off liabilities and to fund guaranteed benefits; employers can terminate pension plans or overfund them; employees can ask for more benefits or claim the assets in the fund. Although the PBGC insures benefits, the insurance agent forbears, not acting quickly to protect its own interests. To prevent potential huge increases in its liabilities, the PBGC could require that employers hedge the guaranteed benefits, and fund their increases in promised benefits. Given its policies, these requirements could protect the PBGC.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy I. Bulow & Myron S. Scholes & Peter Menell, 1982. "Economic Implications of ERISA," NBER Working Papers 0927, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:0927
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeremy I. Bulow, 1979. "Analysis of Pension Funding Under Erisa," NBER Working Papers 0402, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Irwin Tepper, 1981. "Taxation and Corporate Pension Policy," NBER Working Papers 0661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alan Marcus, 1987. "Corporate Pension Policy and the Value of PBGC Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: Issues in Pension Economics, pages 49-80, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Jeremy I. Bulow & Myron S. Scholes, 1983. "Who Owns the Assets in a Defined-Benefit Pension Plan?," NBER Chapters, in: Financial Aspects of the United States Pension System, pages 17-36, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Clark, Robert L. & Gohmann, Stephan F. & McDermed, Ann A., 1988. "Declining Use Of Defined Benefit Pension Plans: Is Federal Regulation The Reason?," Department of Economics and Business - Archive 259433, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics.

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