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Collusion in a Model of Repeated Auctions

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Listed author(s):
  • JOHNSON, Paul
  • ROBERT, Jacques
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    Abstract

    A model of first price sealed bid auctions is developed where bidders meet repeatedly while independently drawing private valuations in each period.Attention is focused on symmetric collusive bidding equilibria when side-payments are not allowed.

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    Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 9909.

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    Length: 37 pages
    Date of creation: 1999
    Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:9909
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    CP 6128, Succ. Centre-Ville, Montréal, Québec, H3C 3J7

    Phone: (514) 343-6540
    Fax: (514) 343-5831
    Web page: http://www.sceco.umontreal.ca

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    Keywords:

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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    1. Mark Bagnoli & Ted Bergstrom, 2005. "Log-concave probability and its applications," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 26(2), pages 445-469, 08.
    2. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    3. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January.
    4. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1979. "Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-9, August.
    5. Graham, Daniel A & Marshall, Robert C, 1987. "Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1217-1239, December.
    6. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-599, June.
      • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    7. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    8. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June.
    9. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
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