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Théorie de la taxation optimale et politique de stabilisation : une incompatibilité théorique ?




This paper intends to analyze some macroeconomic aspects in the framework of the Optimal Taxation Theory. First of all Optimal Taxation filiation will be considered in studying the three functions of the state described in Musgrave's work. The collective book published in 1994, and entitled Modern Public Finance, provides the pieces of integration of the “macroeconomic” function of the state. These models which aim to justify and to base state intervention in the private sphere on microfoundations will be tested. The results show that welfare maximization is not an adequate tool to evaluate public sector impact. Examination of model assumptions shows that optimal stabilization models are built upon a “minimalist” conception of the state, interference of which represents a “social cost”

Suggested Citation

  • Aurélien Beleau, 2013. "Théorie de la taxation optimale et politique de stabilisation : une incompatibilité théorique ?," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13059, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:13059

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Alm, James, 1996. "What Is an "Optimal'"Tax System?," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 49(1), pages 117-33, March.
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    More about this item


    Welfare function; state; public economics; fiscal policy; optimal taxation;

    JEL classification:

    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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