IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mpg/wpaper/2010_44.html

On the Existence and Prevention of Asset Price Bubbles

Author

Listed:
  • Hendrik Hakenes

    (University of Hannover, MPI Bonn)

  • Zeno Enders

    (University of Bonn)

Abstract

We develop a model of rational bubbles based on the assumptions of unknown market liquidity and limited liability of traders. In a bubble, the price of an asset rises dynamically above its steady-state value, justified by rational expectations about future price developments. The larger the expected future price increase, the more likely it is that the bubble will burst because market liquidity becomes exhausted. Depending on the interactions between uncertainty about market liquidity, fundamental riskiness of the asset, the compensation scheme of the fund manager, and the risk-free interest rate, we give a condition for whether rational bubbles are possible. Based on this analysis, we discuss several widely-discussed policy measures with respect to their effectiveness in preventing bubbles. A reduction of manager bonuses or a Tobin tax can create or eliminate the possibility of bubbles, depending on their implementation. Monetary policy and long-term compensation schemes can prevent bubbles.

Suggested Citation

  • Hendrik Hakenes & Zeno Enders, 2010. "On the Existence and Prevention of Asset Price Bubbles," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics 2010_44, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_44
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2010_44online.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hui Ou-Yang, 2003. "Optimal Contracts in a Continuous-Time Delegated Portfolio Management Problem," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(1), pages 173-208.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Julián A.Parra Polanía & Carmiña O.Vargas Riaño, 2012. "Valor óptimo del impuesto sobre flujos de capital para Colombia," Borradores de Economia 715, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    2. Parra-Polanía, Julián Andrés & Vargas-Riaño, Carmiña Ofelia, 2013. "Impuesto pigouviano a los flujos de capitales : una estimación para Colombia," Chapters, in: Rincón-Castro, Hernán & Velasco, Andrés M. (ed.), Flujos de capitales, choques externos y respuestas de política en países emergentes, chapter 16, pages 627-644, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jaeyoung Sung, 2005. "Optimal Contracts Under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard: A Continuous-Time Approach," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(3), pages 1021-1073.
    2. Andrea M. Buffa & Dimitri Vayanos & Paul Woolley, 2022. "Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(12), pages 3146-3201.
    3. Thibaut Mastrolia & Dylan Possamai, 2015. "Moral hazard under ambiguity," Papers 1511.03616, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2016.
    4. Markus Ibert & Ron Kaniel & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Roine Vestman, 2018. "Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid for Investment Skill?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(2), pages 715-772.
    5. Sheng, Jiliang & Wang, Jian & Wang, Xiaoting & Yang, Jun, 2014. "Asymmetric contracts, cash flows and risk taking of mutual funds," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 435-442.
    6. Hu, Xiao & Kang, Siqin & Ren, Long & Zhu, Shaokeng, 2024. "Interactive preference analysis: A reinforcement learning framework," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 319(3), pages 983-998.
    7. Jaeyoung Sung, 2022. "Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(2), pages 593-642, September.
    8. Agarwal, Vikas & Gómez, Juan-Pedro & Priestley, Richard, 2012. "Management compensation and market timing under portfolio constraints," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 1600-1625.
    9. Loyola, Gino & Portilla, Yolanda, 2024. "Optimal financing of highly innovative projects under double moral hazard," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    10. Kumar Muthuraman & Tarik Aouam & Ronald Rardin, 2008. "Regulation of Natural Gas Distribution Using Policy Benchmarks," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 56(5), pages 1131-1145, October.
    11. Egil Matsen, 2005. "Portfolio choice when managers control returns," Working Paper 2005/15, Norges Bank.
    12. Gu Wang & Jiaxuan Ye, 2023. "Fund Managers’ Competition for Investment Flows Based on Relative Performance," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 198(2), pages 605-643, August.
    13. Xiangyu Cui & Jianjun Gao & Yun Shi, 2021. "Multi-period mean–variance portfolio optimization with management fees," Operational Research, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 1333-1354, June.
    14. Nadide Banu Olcay, 2016. "Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(4), pages 255-288, December.
    15. Sascha Desmettre, 2012. "Optimal investment for executive stockholders with exponential utility," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, vol. 35(2), pages 151-170, November.
    16. Kasper Larsen, 2005. "Optimal portfolio delegation when parties have different coefficients of risk aversion," Quantitative Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(5), pages 503-512.
    17. Patrick Bolton & Christopher Harris, 2005. "The Dynamics of Optimal Risk Sharing," Economics Working Papers 0092, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science, revised May 2010.
    18. Szydlowski, Martin, 2019. "Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(3), July.
    19. Sergey Nadtochiy & Thaleia Zariphopoulou, 2018. "Optimal contract for a fund manager, with capital injections and endogenous trading constraints," Papers 1802.09165, arXiv.org.
    20. Romuald Elie & Dylan Possamai, 2016. "Contracting theory with competitive interacting agents," Papers 1605.08099, arXiv.org.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_44. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Marc Martin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mppggde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.