Ambiguous Act Equilibria
A game-theoretic framework that allows for explicitly randomized strategies is used to study the effect of ambiguity aversion on equilibrium outcomes. The notions of "independent strategies" as well as of "common priors" are amended to render them applicable to games in which players lack probabilistic sophistication. Within this framework the equilibrium predictions of two player games with ambiguity averse and with ambiguity neutral players are observationally equivalent. This equivalence result does not extend to the case of games with more than two players. A translation of the concept of equilibrium in beliefs to the context of ambiguity aversion yields substantially di erent predictions – even for the case with just two players.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2010|
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- Andreas Pape & Subir Bose & Emre Ozdenoren, 2004.
"Optimal auctions with ambiguity,"
Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings
609, Econometric Society.
- Cerreia-Vioglio, S. & Maccheroni, F. & Marinacci, M. & Montrucchio, L., 2011.
"Uncertainty averse preferences,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1275-1330, July.
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