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Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation

Author

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  • Jos Jansen

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

Abstract

The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free-rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business-stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms.profits and the probability of innovation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jos Jansen, 2009. "Strategic Information Disclosure and Competition for an Imperfectly Protected Innovation," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_06, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_06
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    Cited by:

    1. Traxler, Christian, 2012. "Majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 1-9.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    R&D competition; innovation; spillovers; information disclosure; strategic substitutes; free-rider effect; externality;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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