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A Unified Social Ontology

Author

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  • Francesco GUALA

    ()

  • Frank HINDRIKS

Abstract

Current debates in social ontology are dominated by approaches that view institutions either as rules or as equilibria of strategic games. We argue that these two approaches can be unified within an encompassing theory based on the notion of correlated equilibrium. We show that in a correlated equilibrium each player follows a regulative rule of the form “if X then do Y”. We then criticize Searle’s claim that constitutive rules of the form “X counts as Y in C” are fundamental building blocks for institutions, showing that such rules can be derived from regulative rules by introducing new institutional terms. Institutional terms are introduced for economy of thought, but are not necessary for the creation of social reality.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco GUALA & Frank HINDRIKS, 2013. "A Unified Social Ontology," Departmental Working Papers 2013-20, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
  • Handle: RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2013-20
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    File URL: http://wp.demm.unimi.it/files/wp/2013/DEMM-2013_20wp.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Endogenizing institutions and institutional changes," Chapters,in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 16, pages 267-297 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Aumann, Robert J, 1987. "Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 1-18, January.
    3. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    4. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Institutions as cognitive media between strategic interactions and individual beliefs," Chapters,in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 17, pages 298-312 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Guala, Francesco & Mittone, Luigi, 2010. "How history and convention create norms: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 749-756, August.
    6. Gintis, Herbert, 2007. "The evolution of private property," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-16, September.
    7. Binmore, Ken, 2005. "Natural Justice," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195178111.
    8. Searle, John R., 2005. "What is an institution?," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(01), pages 1-22, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    institutions; rules; equilibria;

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary

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