Per Unit Versus As Valorem Taxes Under Dynamic Monopoly
In the partial equilibrium framework of a static monopoly, ad valorem taxes always Pareto dominate per unit taxes. This paper shows that this result can actually be reversed in a dynamic framework where the government generates an exogenous stream of revenues through the taxation of commodities produced by a dynamic monopoly (i.e. a single producer facing dynamic demands for an intertemporal good). We show that per unit taxes Pareto dominate ad valorem taxes provided that the per period demands are relatively elastic. We provide a taxonomy concerning the Pareto dominance of the tax systems in this context and numerical examples that support our theoretical results.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||27 Sep 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Forthcoming: In preparation for submission|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: (305) 284-5540
Fax: (305) 284-2985
Web page: http://www.bus.miami.edu/faculty-and-research/academic-departments/economics/index.html
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Hamilton, Stephen F., 1999. "The comparative efficiency of ad valorem and specific taxes under monopoly and monopsony," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 235-238, May.
- Benabou, R. & Tirole, J., 2001.
"Willpower and Personal Rules,"
216, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Delipalla, Sofia & Keen, Michael, 1992.
"The comparison between ad valorem and specific taxation under imperfect competition,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 351-367, December.
- Sofia Delipalla & Michael Keen, 1991. "The Comparison Between Ad Valorem and Specific Taxation under Imperfect Competition," Working Papers 821, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Igal Hendel & Paolo Dudine & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2006. "Storable Good Monopoly: The Role of Commitment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1706-1719, December.
- Azariadis, Costas & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2002. "Fiscal Constitutions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 255-281, April.
- Nancy L. Stokey, 1981. "Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 112-128, Spring.
- Luca Bossi & Vladimir Petkov, 2007. "Habits, Market Power, and Policy Selection," Working Papers 0702, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Michael Keen, 1998. "The balance between specific and ad valorem taxation," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(1), pages 1-37, February.
- Coase, Ronald H, 1972. "Durability and Monopoly," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-49, April.
- Skeath, Susan E. & Trandel, Gregory A., 1994. "A Pareto comparison of ad valorem and unit taxes in noncompetitive environments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 53-71, January.
- Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, 1986.
"A Theory of Rational Addiction,"
University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State
41, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Klemperer, Paul, 1995. "Competition When Consumers Have Switching Costs: An Overview with Applications to Industrial Organization, Macroeconomics, and International Trade," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 515-39, October.
- Driskill, Robert & McCafferty, Stephen, 2001. "Monopoly and Oligopoly Provision of Addictive Goods," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(1), pages 43-72, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mia:wpaper:0703. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher Parmeter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.