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Efficience vs inefficience des organisations publiques : la contribution des théories contractuelles

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  • Céline Chatelin

    (Laboratoire Orléanais de Gestion)

Abstract

Depuis la remise en question de l’efficacité des entreprises publiques dans les années 1960, les privatisations dans le monde ont fortement progressé. Est-ce donc le signe d’une disparition programmée de l’organisation publique ? Nous proposons sur la base de travaux empiriques et théoriques, une analyse comparative des formes organisationnelles publiques et privées à partir des apports offerts par les théories contractuelles. Dans ce contexte théorique, nous montrons que l’organisation publique peut être efficiente. Nous concluons finalement sur la nécessité de développer un cadre théorique des organisations apte à intégrer l’ensemble des variables associées à la propriété, quelle soit publique ou privée.

Suggested Citation

  • Céline Chatelin, 2003. "Efficience vs inefficience des organisations publiques : la contribution des théories contractuelles," Working Papers 2003-5, Laboratoire Orléanais de Gestion - université d'Orléans.
  • Handle: RePEc:log:wpaper:2003-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Schmidt, Klaus M, 1996. "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-24, April.
    8. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-390, June.
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