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Why the young do not buy long-term care insurance


  • Meier, Volker


This paper explains why those individuals who purchase long-term care insurance usually postpone their decision until they reach the age of retirement. This behavior is shown to be rational if there are fixed costs of loading or if there is uncertainty about the costs of disability. Individuals with a low risk of becoming disabled before retirement may prefer to buy insurance late in order to avoid losses in expected income. However, if the probability of becoming disabled after retirement is uncertain, it is generally preferable to buy long-term care insurance early.

Suggested Citation

  • Meier, Volker, 1999. "Why the young do not buy long-term care insurance," Munich Reprints in Economics 19205, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:19205

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Rinaldo Brau & Matteo Lippi Bruni, 2008. "Eliciting the demand for long-term care coverage: a discrete choice modelling analysis," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 411-433.
    2. Coe, Norma B. & Skira, Meghan M. & Van Houtven, Courtney Harold, 2015. "Long-term care insurance: Does experience matter?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 122-131.
    3. CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre & PONTHIERE, Grégory, 2012. "The economics of long-term care: a survey," CORE Discussion Papers 2012030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Costa-Font, Joan & Rovira-Forns, Joan, 2008. "Who is willing to pay for long-term care insurance in Catalonia?," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 72-84, April.

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