Why does the WTO have an Antidumping Agreement?
This paper develops a model that offers a plausible interpretation for the empirical observation of diffusion of antidumping (AD) laws amongst WTO members. Contrary to the regnant belief that this proliferation is driven mainly by retaliatory motives, our model shows that adoption and use of AD laws involve a cooperative act amongst WTO members in an infinite horizon game. The diffusion of AD laws need not result in a Prisonner.s dilemma. Instead we show that the AD agreement of the WTO can serve as a risk-sharing vehicle amongst WTO members in response to adverse shocks incurred by domestic producers.
|Date of creation:||2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +32 (0) 16 / 32 6598
Fax: +32 (0) 16 / 32 6599
Web page: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/licos
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Konings, Jozef & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 2008.
"Heterogeneous responses of firms to trade protection,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 371-383, December.
- Konings, Jozef & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 2008. "Heterogeneous Responses of Firms to Trade Protection," CEPR Discussion Papers 6724, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- MARTIN, Alberto & VERGOTE, Wouter, .
"On the role of retaliation in trade agreements,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-2037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Alberto Martin & Wouter Vergote, 2005. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," Economics Working Papers 914, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2008.
- MARTIN, Alberto & VERGOTE, Wouter, 2007. "On the role of retaliation in trade agreements," CORE Discussion Papers 2007089, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Brander, James & Krugman, Paul, 1983.
"A 'reciprocal dumping' model of international trade,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 15(3-4), pages 313-321, November.
- James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1982. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," Working Papers 513, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- James Brander & Paul Krugman, 1980. "A "Reciprocal Dumping" Model of International Trade," Working Papers 405, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- James A. Brander & Paul Krugman, 1983. "A 'Reciprocal Dumping' Model of International Trade," NBER Working Papers 1194, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Reynolds, 2006.
"The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings,"
Southern Economic Journal,
Southern Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 877–890, April.
- Robert M. Feinberg & Kara M. Olson, 2004. "The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings," International Trade 0411003, EconWPA.
- Chad P. Bown, 2005.
"Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement: Why Are So Few Challenged?,"
The Journal of Legal Studies,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(2), pages 515-555, 06.
- Bown, Chad P., 2005. "Trade remedies and World Trade Organization dispute settlement : Why are so few challenged?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3540, The World Bank.
- Hartigan, James C, 2002. "Endogenous Obfuscation in Injury Investigations," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 69(275), pages 505-23, August.
- Wilfred J. Ethier, 2002. "Unilateralism in a Multilateral World," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(479), pages 266-292, April.
- Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1989.
"A Theory of Managed Trade,"
801, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bruce A. Blonigen, 2003.
"Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S Antidumping Activity,"
NBER Working Papers
9625, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bruce A. Blonigen, 2006. "Evolving discretionary practices of U.S. antidumping activity," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 39(3), pages 874-900, August.
- Bruce A. Blonigen, 2002. "Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S. Antidumping Activity," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2003-20, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Aug 2003.
- Benjamin Liebman, 2004. "ITC voting behavior on sunset reviews," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 446-475, September.
- Mansfield, Edward D. & Milner, Helen V. & Rosendorff, B. Peter, 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(03), pages 477-513, June.
- Murray, Tracy & Turdaliev, Nurlan, 1999. "Universal Dumping of Homogeneous Products," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(4), pages 580-89, November.
- Vandenbussche, Hylke & Veugelers, Reinhilde & Konings, Jozef, 2001. "Unionization and European Antidumping Protection," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(2), pages 297-317, April.
- Michael O. Moore, 2006. "An Econometric Analysis of U.S. Antidumping Sunset Review Decisions," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 142(1), pages 122-150, April.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lic:licosd:25310. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.