Rotten Parents and Child Labor
We show that taking into account the consequences of child labor on both childhood welfare and human capital investment, instead of focusing exclusively on the human capital dimension, brings new insights on the economic analysis of child labor. In particular, there are new sources of potential inefficiencies that appear when we assume that labor induces some disutility. In such a case, household decisions regarding child labor may indeed be inefficient even if household members are altruistic, transfers are not at a corner and there are no market imperfections. Also, the presence of child labor disutility leads to an equilibrium where the conditions for an exogenous reduction of child labor to be Pareto improving are less likely to be fulfilled. This paper stresses therefore the fact that economic analysis should not forget one of the most important aspects of child labor, namely that it does not make children happy.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2002|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: INRA-LEA, 48, Boulevard Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France|
Phone: 331 43136364
Fax: 331 43136362
Web page: http://www.inra.fr/Internet/Departements/ESR/UR/lea/index.html
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1989. "A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1138-59, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lea:leawpi:0202. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Madeleine Roux)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.