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Trade and Strategic Regulatory Bias in Monopolistic Industries



Regulatory standards, such as on health and safety, may be subject to strategic bias when a country engages in trade. Where regulation is to correct an undersupply of quality by a monopolistic industry, if regulators do not cooperate and …rms can vary standards, there will be a tendency to strategic overregulation, which leads to excessive, rather than inadequate trade. When there is a mixture of horizontal and vertical quality regulations, the profit-shifting motive for protection is less than the previous literature suggests. In this case, contrary to previous findings, mutual recognition agreements lead to underregulation.

Suggested Citation

  • T. Huw Edwards, 2004. "Trade and Strategic Regulatory Bias in Monopolistic Industries," Discussion Paper Series 2004-21, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Sep 2004.
  • Handle: RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2004-21

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Lutz, Stefan, 1996. "Vertical Product Differentiation, Quality Standards, and International Trade Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1443, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Das, Satya P. & Donnenfeld, Shabtai, 1989. "Oligopolistic competition and international trade : Quantity and quality restrictions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3-4), pages 299-318, November.
    3. Maskus, Keith E. & Wilson, John S. & Tsunehiro Otsuki, 2000. "Quantifying the impact of technical barriers to trade : a framework for analysis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2512, The World Bank.
    4. H. Lutz, Stefan, 2000. "Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 15, pages 314-344.
    5. Fischer, Ronald & Serra, Pablo, 2000. "Standards and protection," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 377-400, December.
    6. Swann, Peter & Temple, Paul & Shurmer, Mark, 1996. "Standards and Trade Performance: The UK Experience," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1297-1313, September.
    7. Greenaway, David, 1987. "The New Theories of Intra-industry Trade," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 95-120, April.
    8. Baldwin, Richard, 2000. "Regulatory Protectionism, Developing Nations and a Two-Tier World Trade System," CEPR Discussion Papers 2574, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Wallner, Klaus, 1998. "Mutual Recognition and the Strategic Use of International Standards," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 254, Stockholm School of Economics.
    10. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. T.Huw Edwards, 2007. "Horizontal Regulatory Protection. Its appeal and implictions in a linear Cournot duopoly," Discussion Paper Series 2007_05, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Feb 2007.
    2. T.Huw Edwards, 2009. "Regulatory Protection When Firms Move First," Discussion Paper Series 2009_19, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Nov 2009.

    More about this item


    Trade; oligopoly; regulation; standards; harmonisation.;

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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