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Trade and Strategic Regulatory Bias in Monopolistic Industries

Regulatory standards, such as on health and safety, may be subject to strategic bias when a country engages in trade. Where regulation is to correct an undersupply of quality by a monopolistic industry, if regulators do not cooperate and …rms can vary standards, there will be a tendency to strategic overregulation, which leads to excessive, rather than inadequate trade. When there is a mixture of horizontal and vertical quality regulations, the profit-shifting motive for protection is less than the previous literature suggests. In this case, contrary to previous findings, mutual recognition agreements lead to underregulation.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Loughborough University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 2004-21.

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Date of creation: Sep 2004
Date of revision: Sep 2004
Handle: RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2004-21
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Web page: http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/sbe/research/economics/index.html

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  1. Lutz, Stefan, 1996. "Trade Effects of Minimum Quality Standards with and without Deterred Entry," CEPR Discussion Papers 1384, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Das, Satya P. & Donnenfeld, Shabtai, 1989. "Oligopolistic competition and international trade : Quantity and quality restrictions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3-4), pages 299-318, November.
  3. Ronald Fischer & Pablo Serra, 1998. "Standards and Protection," Documentos de Trabajo 45, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
  4. Greenaway, David, 1987. "The New Theories of Intra-industry Trade," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 95-120, April.
  5. Lutz, Stefan, 1996. "Vertical Product Differentiation, Quality Standards, and International Trade Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1443, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Swann, Peter & Temple, Paul & Shurmer, Mark, 1996. "Standards and Trade Performance: The UK Experience," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(438), pages 1297-1313, September.
  7. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
  8. Baldwin, Richard, 2000. "Regulatory Protectionism, Developing Nations and a Two-Tier World Trade System," CEPR Discussion Papers 2574, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Maskus, Keith E. & Wilson, John S. & Tsunehiro Otsuki, 2000. "Quantifying the impact of technical barriers to trade : a framework for analysis," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2512, The World Bank.
  10. Wallner, Klaus, 1998. "Mutual Recognition and the Strategic Use of International Standards," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 254, Stockholm School of Economics.
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