Mutual Recognition and the Strategic Use of International Standards
This paper considers domestic product standards that do not raise the willingness to pay by consumers but increase the costs for foreign suppliers of serving the market. It is shown in a Cournot triopoly model that such standards can be used as strategic tool to raise domestic welfare by creating asymmetry between local and foreign producers. A country can raise its welfare by concluding mutual recognition agreements with a strict subset of its trading partners. In that case exclusively the largest countries agree on mutual recognition of their home standards, to the detriment of the country with the smaller home market.
|Date of creation:||19 Aug 1998|
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