Punishment-Dominance Condition on Stable Two-Sided Matching Algorithms
In this article, we consider a many-to-one two-sided matching market and define a canonical strategic form game, in which any worker applies to the top k firms and is assigned to the most preferred firm that does not reject him/her. Under the substitute property of firms' preferences, the game satisfies the punishment-dominance condition. The deferred-acceptance algorithm by Gale and Shapley (Amer. Math. Monthly 69: 1962), which finds the maximum and minimum of stable matchings, is described as an instance of the algorithm by Masuzawa (Int. Jour. Game Theory 38: 2008), which determines the α-cores of the strategic form games with the punishment-dominance condition.
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