Punishment-Dominance Condition on Stable Two-Sided Matching Algorithms
In this article, we consider a many-to-one two-sided matching market and define a canonical strategic form game, in which any worker applies to the top k firms and is assigned to the most preferred firm that does not reject him/her. Under the substitute property of firms' preferences, the game satisfies the punishment-dominance condition. The deferred-acceptance algorithm by Gale and Shapley (Amer. Math. Monthly 69: 1962), which finds the maximum and minimum of stable matchings, is described as an instance of the algorithm by Masuzawa (Int. Jour. Game Theory 38: 2008), which determines the α-cores of the strategic form games with the punishment-dominance condition.
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| Length: | 14 pages |
| Date of creation: | Oct 2012 |
| Date of revision: | |
| Handle: | RePEc:kei:dpaper:2012-018 |
| Contact details of provider: | Postal: Phone: 81-3-3453-4511 Web page: http://ies.keio.ac.jp/old_project/old/gcoe-econbus/ More information through EDIRC
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- John William Hatfield & Paul R. Milgrom, 2005.
"Matching with Contracts,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 913-935, September.
- Paul Milgrom, 2003. "Matching with Contracts," Working Papers 03003, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
- Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
- repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-90186 is not listed on IDEAS
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