Punishment-Dominance Condition on Stable Two-Sided Matching Algorithms
In this article, we consider a many-to-one two-sided matching market and define a canonical strategic form game, in which any worker applies to the top k firms and is assigned to the most preferred firm that does not reject him/her. Under the substitute property of firms' preferences, the game satisfies the punishment-dominance condition. The deferred-acceptance algorithm by Gale and Shapley (Amer. Math. Monthly 69: 1962), which finds the maximum and minimum of stable matchings, is described as an instance of the algorithm by Masuzawa (Int. Jour. Game Theory 38: 2008), which determines the α-cores of the strategic form games with the punishment-dominance condition.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2012|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://ies.keio.ac.jp/old_project/old/gcoe-econbus/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ruud Hendrickx & Judith Timmer & Peter Borm, 2002. "A note on NTU convexity," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 29-37.
- Roth, Alvin E, 1984. "The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(6), pages 991-1016, December.
- Paul Milgrom, 2003.
"Matching with Contracts,"
03003, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kei:dpaper:2012-018. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Global COE Program Office)The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Global COE Program Office to update the entry or send us the correct address
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.