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Accuracy of proposers' beliefs in an allocation-type game

Author

Listed:
  • Federica Alberti

    (Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena)

  • Anna Conte

    (Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, and Department of Economics and Quantitative Methods , WBS, University of Westminster London)

  • Kei Tsutsui

    (Frankfurt School of Finance and Management)

Abstract

In the context of an allocation game, this paper analyses the proposer's reported beliefs about the responder's willingness to accept (or reject) the proposed split of the pie. The proposer's beliefs are elicited via a quadratic scoring rule. An econometric model of the proposer's beliefs is estimated. The estimated proposer's beliefs are then compared with the actual responder's choices. As a result of this comparison, we observe that the proposer tends to underestimate the empirical acceptance probability, especially when the slice of the pie allocated to the proposer is large.

Suggested Citation

  • Federica Alberti & Anna Conte & Kei Tsutsui, 2014. "Accuracy of proposers' beliefs in an allocation-type game," Jena Economic Research Papers 2014-002, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2014-002
    as

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    File URL: http://www2.wiwi.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2014/wp_2014_002.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Reinhard Selten, 1998. "Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 1(1), pages 43-61, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Model construction and estimation; Allocation game; Beliefs elicitation and evaluation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation
    • C52 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Evaluation, Validation, and Selection
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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