Voluntary Cooperation Based on Equilibrium Retribution - An Experiment Testing Finite-Horizon Folk Theorems
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- Lisa Bruttel & Werner Güth & Ulrich Kamecke, 2012. "Finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments without a commonly known end," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(1), pages 23-47, February.
- Fabian Winter, 2013. "Fairness norms can explain the emergence of specific cooperation norms in the Battle of the Prisoners Dilemma," Jena Economic Research Papers 2013-016, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
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KeywordsFolk theorem; Finite horizon; Prisoners' dilemma; Experiment;
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-05-02 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2009-05-02 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-05-02 (Game Theory)
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